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DeEnte&Essentia.htm
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<!DOCTYPE html>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title>Thomas Aquinas: De ente et essentia: English</title>
<body style="text-align:justify;font-family:Arial">
<blockquote>
<center>
<h1>De Ente et Essentia</h1>
<h2>by<br>
Thomas Aquinas</h2>
<h3>translated as<br>
Aquinas on Being and Essence<br>
a translation and interpretation<br>
1965<br>
<br>
adapted and html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.</h3>
</center>
<hr>
<br>
<table cellpadding="12">
<tbody>
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<td><b>Prooemium</b><br>
Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum philosophum in I caeli et mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suae metaphysicae,
<td>1. A small mistake in the beginning is a big one in the end, according to the Philosopher in the first book of <i>On the Heavens and the Earth</i>. And as Ibn-Sînâ says in the beginning of his <i>Metaphysics</i>, being and essence are what is first conceived by the intellect.
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<td>ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam dicendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur et quomodo in diversis inveniatur et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differentiam.
<td>2. Thus, to avoid making mistakes out of ignorance of them, and to become familiar with the difficulties they entail, we must point out what is signified by the words “being” and “essence,” and how they are found in diverse things, and how they are related to the logical intentions, genus, species, and difference.
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<td>Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in priora devenire, ut, a facilioribus incipientes, convenientior fiat disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiae procedendum est.
<td>3. Since we ought to acquire knowledge of what is simple from what is composed, and come to what is prior from what is posterior, so that, beginning with what is easier, we may progress more suitably in learning; we ought proceed from the meaning of the word “being” to that of the word “essence.”
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<td><b>Caput 1</b><br>
Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V metaphysicae philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. Per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia.
<td>4. We should notice, therefore, that the word “being,” taken without qualifiers, has two uses, as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the <i>Metaphysics</i>. (1) In one way, it is used apropos of what is divided into the ten genera; (2) in another way, it is used to signify the truth of propositions. The difference between the two is that in the second way everything about which we can form an affirmative proposition can be called a being, even though it posits nothing in reality. It is in this way that privations and negations are called beings; for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. In the first way, however, only what posits something in reality can be called a being. In the first way, therefore, blindness and the like are not beings.
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<td>Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei.
<td>5. So, the word “essence” is not taken from the word “being” used in the second way; for some things which do not have an essence are called beings in this way as is clear in the case of privations. Rather, the word “essence” is taken from the word “being” used in the first way. It is for this reason that the Commentator says in the same place that the word “being” used in the first way is what signifies the essence of a real thing.
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<td>Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.
<td>6. And because the word “being” used in this way is used apropos of what is divided into the ten genera, as we have said, the word “essence” must signify something common to all natures, by means of which (nature) diverse beings are placed into diverse genera and species; as, for example, humanity is the essence of man, and so with other things.
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<td>Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid.
<td>7. And because that by which a real thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition expressing what the real thing is, philosophers sometimes use the word “quiddity” for the word “essence.” This is what the Philosopher often calls <i>what something was to be</i>, i.e., that by which it belongs to something to be what it is.
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<td>Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II metaphysicae suae.
<td>8. It is also called form, in the sense in which the word “form” signifies the full determination of each real thing, as Ibn-Sînâ says in the second book of his <i>Metaphysics</i>.
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<td>Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro de duabus naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam.
<td>9. Further, it is given another name, nature, taking the word “nature” in the first of the four ways given by Boethius in his book <i>On the Two Natures</i>. In this way, whatever can in any way be grasped by the intellect is called a nature. For a real thing is not intelligible except through its definition and essence.
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<td>Et sic etiam philosophus dicit in V metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura. Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur.
<td>10. The Philosopher, too, says in the fifth book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> that every substance is a nature. But the word “nature” taken in this way appears to signify the essence of a real thing according as it has an ordering to the thing’s proper operation; and no real thing lacks a proper operation.
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<td>Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.
<td>11. The name “quiddity,” however, is taken from the fact that what is signified by the definition is the essence. But it is called essence from the fact that through it and in it a real being has existence.
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<td>Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de substantiis et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid.
<td>12. Because the word “being” is used absolutely and with priority of substances, and only posteriorly and with qualification of accidents, essence is in substances truly and properly, in accidents only in some way with qualification.
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<td>Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices et quaedam compositae, et in utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim causa eorum quae composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex, quae Deus est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentiae sunt nobis magis occultae, ideo ab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina.
<td>13. Further, some substances are simple and some are composed, and essence is in each. But essence is in simple substances in a truer and more noble way, according to which they also have a more noble existence; for they ─ at least that simple substance which is first, and which is God ─ are the cause of those which are composed. But because the essences of the simple substances are more hidden from us, we ought to begin with the essences of composed substances, so that we may progress more suitably in learning from what is easier.
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<td>In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus.
<td>14. In composed substances there are form and matter, for example, in man soul and body.
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<td>Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est.
<td>15. But we cannot say that either one of them alone may be said to be the essence. That matter alone is not the essence of a real thing is clear, since through its essence a real thing is knowable and assigned to a species or to a genus. But matter alone is neither a principle of knowledge, nor is it that by which something is assigned to a genus or to a species; rather a thing is so assigned by reason of its being something actual.
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<td>Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent.
<td>16. Neither can the form alone of a composed substance be said to be its essence, although some try to assert this. For it is evident from what has been said that essence is what is signified by the definition of a real thing. And the definition of natural substances contains not only form, but matter as well; otherwise natural definitions and mathematical ones would not differ.
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<td>Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non habent. Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit materiam et formam.
<td>17. Neither can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural substance as something added to its essence or as something outside its essence, because this mode of definition is proper to accidents, which do not have a perfect essence. This is why accidents must include in their definition a subject which is outside their genus. It is clear therefore that essence includes matter and form.
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<td>Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem, quae est inter materiam et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, quae omnia essentiae conveniunt. Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est.
<td>18. Further, neither can it be said that essence signifies some relation between matter and form or something added to them, because this would of necessity be an accident or something extraneous to the real thing, and the real thing would not be known through it. And these are traits of essence. For through the form, which is the actuality of matter, matter becomes something actual and something individual. Whence what supervenes does not confer on matter actual existence simply, but such an actual existence; as accidents in fact do. Whiteness, for example, makes something actually white. Whence the acquisition of such a form is not called generation simply, but generation in a certain respect. It remains, therefore, that the word “essence” in composed substances signifies that which is composed of matter and form.
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<td>Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod usia significat compositum. Usia enim apud Graecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam dicit quod quiditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et materiae. Commentator etiam dicit super VII metaphysicae: natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma.
<td>19. Boethius is in agreement with this in his commentary on the <i>Predicaments</i>, where he says that <i>ousia</i> signifies the composite. For <i>ousia</i> in Greek is the same as <i>essentia</i> in Latin, as he himself says in his book <i>On the Two Natures</i>. Ibn-Sînâ, too, says that the quiddity of composed substances is the composition itself of form and matter. And the Commentator, likewise, in his considerations on the seventh book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> says: “The nature which species have in generable things is something in between, i.e., composed of matter and form.”
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<td>Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi. Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa.
<td>20. Reason, too, is in accord with this, because the existence of a composed substance is not the existence of the form alone nor of the matter alone, but of the composite itself; and essence is that according to which a real thing is said to be. Whence it is necessary that the essence, whereby a real thing is denominated a being, be neither the form alone nor the matter alone, but both, although the form alone in its own way is the cause of such existence.
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<td>Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui calidum et humidum complectitur.
<td>21. We see the same in other things which are constituted of a plurality of principles, namely, that the real thing is not denominated from one of these principles alone, but from what includes both, as is evident in the case of tastes. Sweetness, for example, is caused by the action of what is hot dispersing what is moist; and although heat in this way is the cause of sweetness, a body is not denominated sweet from heat, but from the taste which includes what is hot and what is moist.
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<td>Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quae materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur.
<td>22. But matter is the principle of individuation. From this it might perhaps appear to follow that an essence which includes in itself matter along with form is only particular and not universal. And from this it would follow that universals would not have a definition, if essence is that which is signified by a definition.
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<td>Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si Socrates diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non signata.
<td>23. We should notice, therefore, that the principle of individuation is not matter taken in just any way whatever, but only designated matter. And I call that matter designated which is considered under determined dimensions. Such matter is not placed in the definition of man as man, but it would be placed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition. Rather, it is non-designated matter which. is placed in the definition of man; for this bone and this flesh are not placed in the definition of man, but bone and flesh absolutely. These latter are man’s non-designated matter.
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<td>Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde Commentator dicit super VII metaphysicae: Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius.
<td>24. It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ, except as the non-designated from the designated. Whence the Commentator says in his considerations on the seventh book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> that “Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity.”
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<td>Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur.
<td>25. The essence of the genus and that of the species also differ in this way, i.e., as the non-designated from the designated, although the mode of the designation differs in each case. Whereas the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference which is taken from the form of the thing.
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<td>Haec autem determinatio vel designatio, quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur.
<td>26. This designation which is in the species with respect to the genus is not through something in the essence of the species which is in no way in the essence of the genus; rather, whatever is in the species is also in the genus, but as undetermined. For, if animal were not the whole that man is, but a part of man, it would not be predicated of man, since no integral part may be predicated of its whole.
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<td>Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus. Non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis. Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest.
<td>27. We can see how this comes about if we examine how body taken as part of animal differs from body taken as genus; for body cannot be a genus in the same way in which body is an integral part.
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<td>Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti. Et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic anima erit praeter id quod significatum est nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur animal.
<td>28. The word “body” can be taken in many ways. Body according as it is in the genus substance is so called from the fact that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in it; but the three designated dimensions themselves are a body according as body is in the genus quantity. Now, it happens in things that what has one perfection may also attain to further perfection. This is clear, for example, in man who has a sensitive nature, and further an intellectual nature. Similarly, another perfection, such as life or some other such perfection, can be added to the perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it. The word “body,” therefore can signify some real thing which has a form from which follows the possibility of designating in it three dimensions, and signify this in an excluding way, i.e., in such a way such that no further perfection may follow from that form; in a way such that if anything be added, it is outside the signification of body. Taken in this way, body will be an integral and material part of animal because soul will be outside what is signified by the word “body”; the soul will be something over and above the body, in a way such that animal is constituted out of these two as out of parts, i.e., out of soul and body.
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<td>Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius.
<td>29. The word “body” can also be taken in another way, namely, to signify a thing which has a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, no matter what sort of form it is, whether some further perfection can come from it or not. And taken in this way, body will be a genus of animal, because there is nothing in animal which is not implicitly contained in body. Soul is not a form other than the form through which three dimensions could be designated in that thing; thus, when we said that body is that which has a form such that because of it three dimensions can be designated in the body, form meant any form, whether animality or stoneness, or any other form. And so the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, when body is its genus.
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<td>Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. Si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, quae habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum praecisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul.
<td>30. And such likewise is the relation of animal to man. For, if animal were to name only that thing which has a perfection such that it can sense and be moved by a principle within itself, and name this thing as excluding other perfection, then any further perfection would be related to animal as a part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and so, animal would not be a genus. Animal is a genus according as it signifies a thing from whose form the senses and movement can come forth, no matter what sort of form it is, whether a sensible soul only or a soul which is both sensible and rational.
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<td>Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam; similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode,
<td>31. The genus, thus, signifies indeterminately everything that is in the species; it does not signify the matter alone. Similarly, the difference, too, signifies everything in the species, and not the form alone; the definition, too, signifies the whole, and so does the species, but in diverse ways.
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<td>quia genus significat totum ut quaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione propriae formae. Unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem.
<td>32. The genus signifies the whole as a name determining what is material in the real thing without the determination of the proper form. Whence the genus is taken from the matter, although it is not the matter. And from this it is clear that a body is called a body from the fact that it has a perfection such that three dimensions can be designated in the body, and that this perfection is related materially to further perfection.
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<td>Differentia vero e converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum. Et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit philosophus in III metaphysicae et in IV topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione.
<td>33. The difference, on the contrary, is a name taken from a determinate form, and taken in a determinate way, i.e. as not including a determinate matter in its meaning. This is clear, for example, when we say <i>animated</i>, i.e., that which has a soul; for what it is, whether a body or something other, is not expressed. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as something outside its essence, as the subject also is understood in its properties. And this is why the genus is not predicated essentially of the difference, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> and in the fourth book of the <i>Topics</i>, but only in the way in which a subject is predicated of its property.
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<td>Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae.
<td>34. The definition, lastly, and the species include both, namely the determinate matter which the name of the genus designates, and the determinate form which the name of the difference designates.
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<td>Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa,
<td>35. From this it is clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related proportionately to the matter, to the form, and to the composite in the real world, although they are not identical with them.
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<td>quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum.
<td>36. The genus is not the matter, but taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the difference the form, but taken from the form as signifying the whole.
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<td>Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res tertia constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo enim neque est anima neque corpus. Sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis formae, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. Intellectus autem huius differentiae rationalis consistit in determinatione formae specialis. Ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit praedicationem earum rerum, ex quibus constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit praedicationem eorum intellectuum, ex quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia.
<td>37. Whence we say that man is a rational animal, and not that man is made up of animal and rational as we say that man is made up of soul and body. Man is said to be composed of soul and body as some third thing constituted of two other things, and which is neither of them. For man is neither soul nor body. But if man may be said in some way to be composed of animal and rational, it will not be as a third thing out of two other things, but as a third concept out of two other concepts. For the concept “animal” is without the determination of the form of the species, and it expresses the nature of a thing from that which is material in relation to the ultimate perfection. But the concept of the difference “rational” consists in the determination of the form of the species. And from these two concepts the concept of the species or of the definition is constituted. And thus just as the constituents of a real thing are not predicated of that real thing, so too the concepts which are constituents of another concept are not predicated of that concept; for we do not say that the definition is the genus or the difference.
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<td>Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut diversarum specierum, quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia,
<td>38. Although the genus signifies the whole essence of the species, it is not necessary that the diverse species in a same genus have one essence.
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<td>quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit, non autem ita, quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia, quae sit differentia determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat materiam, quae est una numero, sed quia genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determinate hanc vel illam, quam determinate differentia exprimit, quae non est alia quam illa, quae indeterminate significabatur per genus.
<td>39. For the oneness of the genus proceeds from its very indetermination or indifference; not however in such a way that what is signified by the genus is some numerically one nature found in diverse species, and to which another thing supervenes, namely the difference, determining the genus as form determines matter which is numerically one. It is rather because the genus signifies some form, not determinately this form or that form, which the difference expresses determinately, but which is not other than the form which was indeterminately signified by the genus.
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<td>Et ideo dicit Commentator in XI metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omnium formarum, sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem formae significatae.
<td>40. This is why the Commentator says in his considerations on the eleventh book of the <i>Metaphysics</i> that prime matter is said to be one by reason of the removal of all forms, whereas the genus is said to be one by reason of the commonness of the designated form.
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<td>Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae remota illa indeterminatione, quae erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species per essentiam diversae.
<td>41. Whence, it is clear that when one adds the difference and removes that indetermination which was the cause of the oneness of the genus, there remain species which are diverse in essence.
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<td>Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei,
<td>42. The nature of the species, as we have said, is indeterminate in relation to the individual, as the nature of the genus is indeterminate in relation to the species.
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<td>inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte.
<td>43. Because of this, just as that which is a genus, as predicated of the species, implies in its signification, though indistinctly, everything that is determinately in the species; so too that which is a species, according as it is predicated of the individual, must signify, though indistinctly, everything which is essentially in the individual.
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<td>Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, quae est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id unde homo est homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata. Et quia pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur.
<td>44. And it is in this way that the essence of the species is signified by the word “man”; whence man is predicated of Socrates. But if the nature of the species is signified as excluding designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, it will be as a part; and in this way it is signified by the word “humanity,” for humanity signifies that by which man is man; and it is not the case that man is man by reason of designated matter. And so designated matter is in no way included among the things by which man is man. Since, therefore, humanity includes in its concept only those things by which man is man, it is clear that designated matter is excluded from or is cut out of its signification. And because a part is not predicated of its whole, humanity is not predicated of man, nor is it predicated of Socrates.
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<td>Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi non est ipsum compositum, cuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, licet sit composita, non est homo, immo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia designata.
<td>45. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the quiddity of a composite is not the composite itself whose quiddity it is, even though the quiddity too is composed. Humanity, for example, though composed, is not man; it must be received into something which is designated matter.
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<td>Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei respectu generis est per formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, significat partem formalem.
<td>46. As we have said, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through forms, whereas the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter. This is why the word which signifies that from which the nature of the genus is taken, and signifies it as excluding the determinate form which perfects the species, must signify a material part of the whole, as, for example, body is a material part of man. But the word which signifies that from which the nature of the species is taken, and signifies it as excluding designated matter, signifies a formal part.
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<td>Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari.
<td>47. And thus humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is said to be the form of the whole, not indeed as something added to the essential parts, namely to form and matter, as the form of a house is added to its integral parts; rather, it is a form which is a whole, that is, a form which includes both form and matter, but which excludes those things by reason of which matter can be designated.
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<td>Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. Unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur.
<td>48. It is clear, therefore, that the word “man” and the word “humanity” signify the essence of man, but diversely, as we have said; the word “man” signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it does not exclude designation by matter, but contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as we have said before that the genus contains the difference. And this is why the word “man” is predicated of individuals. But the word “humanity” signifies it as a part, because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man as man, and it excludes all designation by matter. Whence it is not predicated of individual men.
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<td>Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates.
<td>49. And this is why the word “essence” is sometimes found predicated of a real thing, for we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes it is denied, as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.
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<td><b>Caput 2</b><br>
Viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis compositis videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis, speciei et differentiae.
<td>50. Having seen what is signified by the word “essence” in composed substances, we must see how a composed essence is related to the notion of the genus, of the species, and of the difference.
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<td>Quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel differentiae, praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, conveniat essentiae secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed differentiae principium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species nec animalitas genus.
<td>51. Because that to which the notion of the genus, or of the species, or of the difference, belongs is predicated of this designated singular, it is impossible that the notion of a universal ─ e.g., of the genus or of the species ─ belong to an essence according as it is signified a part, as by the word “humanity” or “animality.” And this is why Ibn-Sînâ says that rationality is not a difference, but the principle of a difference. And for the same reason humanity is not a species, and animality not a genus.
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<td>Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens extra singularia, ut Platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur de hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est; nec iterum illud separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis.
<td>52. Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion of the genus, or of the species, belongs to an essence as to some real thing existing outside singular things, as the Platonists held, because in this way the genus and the species would not be predicated of this individual; for it cannot be said that Socrates is what is separated from him. Nor, further, would this separated something be of any use in knowing this singular.
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<td>Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in individuo est.
<td>53. Whence it remains that the notion of the genus, or of the species, belongs to an essence according as it is signified as a whole, as by the word “man” or “animal” according as it contains implicitly and indistinctly everything that is in the individual.
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<td>Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius. Et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia, homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt. Album vero aut nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari.
<td>54. Now, a nature or essence signified as a whole can be considered in two ways. In one way it can be considered according to its proper content, and this is an absolute consideration of it. And in this way nothing is true of it except what belongs to it as such; whence if anything else is attributed to it, the attribution is false. For example, to man as man belong rational and animal, and whatever else falls in his definition. But white or black, or anything of this sort, which is not of the content of humanity, does not belong to man as man. Whence, if one should ask whether the nature so considered can be said to be one or many, neither should be allowed, because each is outside the content of humanity and either can be added to it. For if plurality were of its content, it could never be one, as it is in Socrates. Similarly, if oneness were of its content, then the nature of Socrates and Plato would be one and the same, and it could not be plurified into many individuals.
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<td>Alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius, in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, quia Socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non conveniat homini in eo quod homo.
<td>55. In the other way an essence is considered according to the existence it has in this or that. When the essence is so considered, something is predicated of it accidentally, by reason of that in which it is; for example, it is said that man is white because Socrates is white, although to be white does not belong to man as man.
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<td>Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. Et in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singulare. Similiter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam esset in eo. Sed verum est dicere quod homo non in quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima. Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum.
<td>56. This nature has a twofold existence, one in singular things, the other in the soul; and accidents follow upon the nature according to either existence. In singular things it has a multiple existence in accord with the diversity of these singular things; yet the existence of none of these things belongs to the nature considered in itself, i.e., absolutely. For it is false to say that the nature of man, as such, has existence in this singular thing; because if existence in this singular thing belonged to man as man, man would never exist outside this singular thing. Similarly, if it belonged to man as man not to exist in this singular thing, man would never exist in it. But it is true to say that it does not belong to man as man to exist in this or that singular thing, or in the soul. It is clear, therefore, that the nature of man, absolutely considered, abstracts from any of these existences, but in a way such that it excludes no one of them.
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<td>Et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicatur de individuis omnibus. Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas. Naturae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutam considerationem. Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas inveniretur communitas. Et hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum.
<td>57. And it is the nature so considered which is predicated of all individuals. Yet it cannot be said that the notion of a universal belongs to the nature so considered, because oneness and commonness are of the notion of a universal. Neither of these belongs to human nature considered absolutely, for if commonness were of the content of man, commonness would be found in whatever thing humanity is found. And this is false, because in Socrates there is no commonness, but whatever is in him is individuated.
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<td>Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit.
<td>58. Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion of the genus or of the species attaches to human nature according as it has existence in individuals, because human nature is not found in individuals with a oneness such that it would be some one thing belonging to all, which the notion of a universal requires.
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<td>Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu.
<td>59. It remains, therefore, that the notion of the species attaches to human nature according to the existence it has in the intellect.
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<td>Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus, et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua, quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia individua intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. Unde dicit Commentator in principio de anima quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in sua metaphysica.
<td>60. For human nature exists in the intellect in abstraction from all that individuates; and this is why it has a content which is the same in relation to all individual men outside the soul; it is equally the likeness of all of them, and leads to a knowledge of all insofar as they are men. And it is from the fact that the nature has such a relation to all individuals that the intellect discovers and attributes the notion of the species to it. Whence the Commentator says in his considerations on the first book of <i>On the Soul</i> that “it is the intellect which causes universality in things.” Ibn-Sînâ, too, says this in his <i>Metaphysics</i>.
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<td>Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis. Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris in III de anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellectae unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere, quia non est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum,
<td>61. And although the intellectually grasped nature has the character of a universal according as it is compared to things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of all of them; still according as it exists in this intellect or in that one, it is something particular ─ a particular species grasped by a particular intellect. From this one can see the weakness of what the Commentator says in his considerations of the third book of <i>On the Soul</i>; from the universality of the intellectually grasped form he wanted to conclude that there is one intellect in all men. This falls short of the truth because the intellectually grasped form has its universality not according to the existence which it has in an intellect, but according as it is related to real things as a likeness of them.
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<td>sicut etiam, si esset una statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundum quod esset commune repraesentativum plurium.
<td>62. What is true here is like what would be true of a corporeal statue representing many men: the image or form of the statue would have its own and individual existence according as it exists in this matter, and it would have the character of commonness according as it is the common representation of many.
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<td>Et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considerationem convenit quod praedicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non praedicatur de Socrate, ut dicatur: Socrates est species, quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei conveniret homini secundum esse, quod habet in Socrate vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam, scilicet in quantum est homo. Quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo praedicatur de Socrate.
<td>63. Further, because it belongs to human nature absolutely considered to be predicated of Socrates, and because the notion of the species does not belong to it absolutely considered but is among the accidents which follow upon it according to the existence it has in the intellect, one can see why the word “species” is not predicated of Socrates, i.e., why it is not said that “Socrates is a species.” This would of necessity be said if the notion of the species belonged to man according to the existence which man has in Socrates; or, if the notion of the species belonged to man absolutely considered, i.e., to man as man, for whatever belongs to man as man is predicated of Socrates.
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<td>Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. Praedicatio enim est quiddam, quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur. Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, quae similiter per actum intellectus completur. Nihilominus tamen id, cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal.
<td>64. Still, to be predicated belongs to the genus in virtue of what it is, since this is placed in its definition. For predication is something which is achieved by the combining and dividing activity of the intellect, and which has for its foundation in the real thing the union of those things, one of which is said of another. Whence the notion of predicability can be included in the notion of that intention which is the genus, which (intention) is similarly achieved by the activity of the intellect. Nonetheless, that to which the intellect, combining one thing with another, attributes the intention of predicability is not the intention of the genus itself; rather it is that to which the intellect attributes the intention of the genus, for example, that which is signified by the word “animal.”
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<td>Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his, quae conveniunt ei secundum suam absolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur ipsam secundum esse, quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio generis vel differentiae.
<td>65. It is clear, therefore, how an essence or nature is related to the notion of the species. The notion of the species is not among the things which belong to the nature absolutely considered, nor is it among the accidents which follow upon the nature according to the existence it has outside the soul, as whiteness or blackness. Rather the notion of the species is among the accidents which follow upon the nature according to the existence it has in the intellect; and it is in this way, too, that the notion of the genus and of the difference belong to it.
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<td><b>Caput 3</b><br>
Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia et causa prima.
<td>66. It remains, now, for us to see in what way essence is in separated substances, namely, in the soul, in the intelligences, and in the First Cause.
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<td>Quamvis autem simplicitatem causae primae omnes concedant, tamen compositionem formae et materiae quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in animam, cuius positionis auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri fontis vitae.
<td>67. Although everyone admits the simplicity of the First Cause, some try to introduce a composition of matter and form in the intelligences and in souls. The originator of this position appears to have been Ibn-Gabirol, author of the book <i>Fountain of Life</i>.
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<td>Hoc autem dictis philosophorum communiter repugnat, qui eas substantias a materia separatas nominant et absque omni materia esse probant. Cuius demonstratio potissima est ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est. Videmus enim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia et a condicionibus eius; nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu, nisi per virtutem substantiae intelligentis secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum quod aguntur per eam.
<td>68. But this is not in agreement with what philosophers commonly say, because they call them substances separated from matter, and prove them to be without all matter. The strongest demonstration of this is from the power of understanding which is in them. For we see that forms are not actually intelligible except according as they are separated from matter and from its conditions; nor are they made actually intelligible except by the power of a substance understanding them, according as they are received into, and are affected by, that substance.
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<td>Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia, ut est de formis materialibus.
<td>69. Whence it is necessary that there be in any intelligent substance a total freedom from matter, such that the substance does not have matter as a part of itself, such too that the substance is not a form impressed on matter, as is the case with material forms.
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<td>Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non impediat materia quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione materiae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali. Et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu intelligibilis est, sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur. Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus,
<td>70. Nor can it be said that it is only corporeal matter that impedes intelligibility, and not any matter whatsoever. For if this were so by reason of corporeal matter alone, then it would have to be that matter impedes intelligibility by reason of the corporeal form, since matter is called corporeal only according as it is found under the corporeal form. But this cannot be ─ namely, that matter impedes intelligibility by reason of the corporeal form ─ because the corporeal form itself, just as other forms, is actually intelligible according as it is abstracted from matter. Whence there is in no way a composition of matter and form in the soul or in an intelligence if matter in them is taken in the sense in which matter is taken in corporeal substances.
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<td>sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. Unde in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse, et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quiditate vel natura simplici.
<td>71. But there is in them a composition of form and existence. Whence it is said, in the commentary on the ninth proposition of the <i>Book on Causes</i>, that “an intelligence is something having form and existence,” and form is taken there for the simple quiddity or nature itself.
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<td>Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre. Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat esse materiae. Et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma. Tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia. Forma enim non habet in eo quod est forma dependentiam ad materiam, sed si inveniantur aliquae formae, quae non possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum quod sunt distantes a primo principio, quod est actus primus et purus. Unde illae formae, quae sunt propinquissimae primo principio, sunt formae per se sine materia subsistentes (non enim forma secundum totum genus suum materia indiget, ut dictum est) et huiusmodi formae sunt intelligentiae. Et ideo non oportet ut essentiae vel quiditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma.
<td>72. It is easy to see how this may be so. Whatever things are so related to one another that one is a cause of the other’s existence, the one which is the cause can have existence without the other, but not conversely. Now the relation of matter and form is such that form gives existence to matter. It is impossible, therefore, that matter exist without some form. But it is not impossible that some form exist without matter, for form, to the extent that it is form, does not depend on matter. But if some forms are found which cannot exist except in matter, this happens to them because of their distance from the first principle, which is first and pure act. Whence those forms which are nearest to the first principle are forms subsisting of themselves, that is without matter. For not every sort of form needs matter, as has been said; and the intelligences are forms of this sort. And therefore it is not necessary that the essences or quiddities of these substances be other than form itself.
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<td>In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiae simplicis quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est forma tantum.
<td>73. Thus the essence of a composed substance and that of a simple substance differ in this: the essence of a composed substance is not form alone, but includes form and matter; the essence of a simple substance is form alone.
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<td>Et ex hoc causantur duae aliae differentiae: una est quod essentia substantiae compositae potest significari ut totum vel ut pars, quod accidit propter materiae designationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non quolibet modo praedicatur essentia rei compositae de ipsa re composita; non enim potest dici quod homo sit quiditas sua. Sed essentia rei simplicis, quae est sua forma, non potest significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi praeter formam quasi formam recipiens; et ideo quocumque modo sumatur essentia substantiae simplicis de ea praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod quiditas simplicis est ipsummet simplex, quia non est aliquid aliud recipiens ipsam.
<td>74. And from this follow two other differences. One difference is that the essence of a composed substance can be signified as a whole or as a part. This happens on account of the designation of matter, as has been said. And therefore the essence of a composed thing is not predicated of the composed thing itself in just any way, for it cannot be said that man is his quiddity. But the essence of a simple thing, which (essence) is its form, cannot be signified except as a whole, since nothing is there besides the form as receiving the form. Thus, no matter what way the essence of a simple substance is taken, it is predicated of the simple substance. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says that the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, because there is nothing other receiving the quiddity.
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<td>Secunda differentia est quod essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sed cum essentia simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis plura individua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua, tot sunt ibi species, ut Avicenna expresse dicit.
<td>75; The second difference is that the essences of composed things, because they are received into designated matter, are multiplied according to its division. And this is why it happens that certain things are the same in species and diverse in number. But since the essence of a simple thing is not received into matter, such a multiplication is impossible here. And this is why, of necessity, many individuals of a same species are not found among these substances; rather, as Ibn-Sînâ expressly says, there are among them as many species as there are individuals.
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<td>Huiusmodi ergo substantiae quamvis sint formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae. Et hoc sic patet.
<td>76. Although substances of this sort are forms alone without matter, they are not utterly simple so as to be pure act. They have an admixture of potency, which becomes clear in the following consideration.
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<td>Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse;
<td>77. Whatever is not of the understood content of an essence or quality is something which comes from without and makes a composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without the things which are parts of it. Now, every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being understood about its existence. For I can understand what a man is, or what a phoenix is, and yet not know whether they have existence in the real world. It is clear, therefore, that existence is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there exists a thing whose quiddity is its existence.
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<td>et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species, vel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus, esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res, quae sit esse tantum, ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentiae, quia iam non esset esse tantum, sed esse et praeter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materiae, quia iam esset esse non subsistens sed materiale.
<td>78. And there can be but one such thing, the First Thing, because it is impossible to plurify a thing except: (1) by the addition of some difference, as the nature of the genus is multiplied in its species, or (2) by the reception of a form into diverse matters, as the nature of the species is multiplied in diverse individuals, or (3) by this: that one is absolute and the other is received into something; for example, if there were a separated heat, it would by virtue of its very separation be other than heat which is not separated. Now, if we posit a thing which is existence alone, such that this existence is subsistent, this existence will not receive the addition of a difference because it would no longer be existence alone, but existence plus some form. And much less will it receive the addition of matter because it would no longer be a subsistent existence, but a material existence. Whence it remains that such a thing, which is its own existence, cannot be but one.
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<td>Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit suum esse, non potest esse nisi una. Unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re praeter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua. Unde oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam; et ideo dictum est quod intelligentia est forma et esse.
<td>79. Whence it is necessary, that in every thing other than this one its existence be other than its quiddity, or its nature, or its form. Whence it is necessary that existence in the intelligences be something besides the form, and this is why it was said that an intelligence is form and existence.
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<td>Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei (dico sicut a causa efficiente) quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne, quod est per aliud, reducitur ad illud quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res, quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus, eo quod ipsa est esse tantum. Alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res, quae non est esse tantum, habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse et quod esse habet a primo ente, quod est esse tantum. Et hoc est causa prima, quae Deus est.
<td>80. Now, whatever belongs to a thing is either caused by the principles of its nature, as the ability to laugh in man, or comes to it from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun. But it cannot be that the existence of a thing is caused by the form or quiddity of that thing ─ I say caused as by an efficient cause ─ because then something would be its own cause, and would bring itself into existence, which is impossible. It is therefore necessary that every such thing, the existence of which is other than its nature, have its existence from some other thing. And because every thing which exists by virtue of another is led back, as to its first cause, to that which exists by virtue of itself, it is necessary that there be some thing which is the cause of the existence of all things because it is existence alone. Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress among causes, since every thing which is not existence alone has a cause of its existence, as has been said. It is clear, therefore, that an intelligence is form and existence, and that it has existence from the First Being, which is existence alone. And this is the First Cause, which is God.
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<td>Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius. Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma, quae est intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a Deo recipit; et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce.
<td>81. Now everything which receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives, and what is received into it is its act. It is necessary therefore that the quiddity itself or the form, which is the intelligence, be in potency with respect to the existence which it receives from God; and this existence is received as an act. It is in this way that potency and act are found in the intelligences, but not form and matter, unless equivocally.
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<td>Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et omnia huiusmodi, quae videntur rebus ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce conveniunt substantiis intellectualibus et corporalibus, ut in III de anima Commentator dicit.
<td>82. Whence, to <i>suffer</i>, and to <i>receive</i>, and <i>to be a subject</i>, and all things of this sort, which are observed to belong to things by reason of matter, also belong equivocally to intellectual and to corporeal substances, as the Commentator says in his considerations on the third book of <i>On The Soul</i>.
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<td>Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, et esse suum receptum a Deo est id, quo subsistit in rerum natura. Et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo est et quod est vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit.
<td>83. And because the quiddity of an intelligence is, as has been said, the intelligence itself, its quiddity or essence is identically that which it itself is; and its existence received from God is that whereby it subsists in reality. And this is why substances of this sort are said by some to be composed of “that by which it is” and “that which is,” or as Boethius says, of “that which is” and “existence.”
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<td>Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit difficile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum; quod esset impossibile, si nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde Commentator dicit in III de anima quod, si natura intellectus possibilis esset ignorata, non possemus invenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad invicem secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis.
<td>84. And because there is potency in the intelligences as well as act, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were no potency in them. Whence the Commentator says, in his considerations on the third book of <i>On The Soul</i>, that if the nature of the possible intellect were not known, we would not be able to find multitude among the separated substances. The separated substances, therefore, are distinct from one another according to their grade of potency and act, in such a way that a superior intelligence which is nearer to the First Being has more act and less potency, and so with the others.
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<td>Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III de anima dicit. Et ideo philosophus comparat eam tabulae, in qua nihil est scriptum.
<td>85. This grading has its termination in the human soul, which holds the lowest grade among intellectual substances. Whence its possible intellect is related to intelligible forms in the way in which prime matter, which holds the lowest grade in sensible existence, is related to sensible forms, as the Commentator remarks in his considerations on the third book of <i>On The Soul</i>. And this is why the Philosopher compares it to a blank tablet on which nothing has been written.
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<td>Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum, ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse, prout est animae, non sit dependens a corpore.
<td>86. And because it has more potency than other intelligible substances, the human soul is so close to material things that a material thing is drawn to it to share its existence, but in such a way that from soul and body results one existence in one composed thing; and yet this existence is not dependent on the body inasmuch as it is the soul’s existence.
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<td>Et ideo post istam formam, quae est anima, inveniuntur aliae formae plus de potentia habentes et magis propinquae materiae in tantum quod esse earum sine materia non est. In quibus etiam invenitur ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimae materiae. Unde nec aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum exigentiam qualitatum activarum et passivarum et aliarum, quibus materia ad formam disponitur.
<td>87. And posterior to this form which is the soul are found other forms which have more potency, and which are still closer to matter, so close that they do not exist without matter. Among these forms, too, is found an order and a grading, down to the first forms of the elements, which are the closest to matter. These last are so close to matter that they operate only according to the active and passive qualities, and the other sorts of things, which are required as the means by which matter is disposed for the receiving of form.
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<td><b>Caput 4</b><br>
His igitur visis patet quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis.
<td>88. From the preceding it is clear how essence is found in diverse substances. For we find that they have essence in three different ways.
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<td>Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis, quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis.
<td>89. There is a thing, God, whose essence is his existence itself. And this is why we find some philosophers who say that God does not have a quiddity or essence, because his essence is not other than his existence. And from this it follows that he is not in a genus, because everything which is in a genus must have a quiddity which is other than its existence. And this is so since the quiddity or nature of a genus or species, in the case of those things which have a genus or species, is not multiplied according to the intelligible content of the nature; rather, it is the existence in these diverse things which is diverse.
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<td>Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus, qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale, quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse, quod Deus est, huius condicionis est, ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit; unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse. Propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praecisionem additionis; quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse, in quo super esse aliquid adderetur.
<td>90. Nor is it necessary, if we say that God is existence alone, for us to fall into the error of those who say that God is universal existence whereby each and every thing formally exists. For the existence which God is, is such that no addition can be made to it. Whence by virtue of its purity it is an existence distinct from every existence. This is why, in the commentary on the ninth proposition of the <i>Book on Causes</i>, it is said that the individuation of the First Cause, which is existence alone, is through its pure goodness. But as regards that universal existence, just as it does not include in its intelligible content any addition, so too neither does it include in its intelligible content any exclusion of addition, because if this were the case, nothing in which something is added over and above its existence could be understood to be.
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<td>Similiter etiam, quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet omnes perfectiones, quae sunt in omnibus generibus. Propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut philosophus et Commentator in V metaphysicae dicunt. Sed habet eas modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem habent. Et hoc est, quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, ita Deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfectiones habet.
<td>91. Similarly, although God is existence alone, it is not necessary that the other perfections or excellences be wanting in him. Rather he has all the perfections which are in every genus. This is why he is called simply perfect, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say in book five of the <i>Metaphysics</i>. But he has these perfections in a more excellent way than all things because in him they are one, whereas in other things they have diversity. And this is so because all these perfections belong to him according to his simple existence. If some one could perform the operations of all the qualities through some one quality, he would have every quality in that one quality; so too God has all these perfections in his existence itself.
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<td>Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis, sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius. Sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius, quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis eas.
<td>92. Essence is found in a second way in created intellectual substances. Existence in them is other than their essence, although essence is without matter. Whence their existence is not absolute, but received, and therefore limited and confined to the capacity of the recipient nature. But their nature or quiddity is absolute, not received in any matter. And this is why it is said in the <i>Book on Causes</i> that the intelligences are unlimited from below and limited from above, for they are limited as regards their existence, which they receive from above; but they are not limited from below because their forms are not limited to the capacity of a matter receiving them.
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<td>Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus, cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore, cuius est actus, non tamen oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum, ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio dependet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem.
<td>93. And this is why, as has been said, there is not found among such substances a multitude of individuals in one species, with the exception of the human soul on account of the body to which it is united. And although its individuation depends on the body as upon the occasion for its beginning because it does not acquire its individuated existence except in the body of which it is the actuality, it is not necessary that its individuation be lost when the body is taken away because that existence, since it is absolute, always remains individuated once the soul acquires it by being made the form of this individual body. And this is why Ibn-Sînâ says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body as regards its beginning, but not as regards its termination.
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<td>Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in praedicamento, et propter hoc invenitur in eis genus et species et differentia, quamvis earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt, unde significantur per differentias accidentales, quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis. Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt; unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales differentias a nobis significari possunt.
<td>94. And because quiddity in these substances is not the same as existence, they are orderable within a predicament. And this is why they have a genus, a species, and a difference, although their proper differences are hidden from us. For even in the case of sensible things, the essential differences themselves are not known; whence they are signified through accidental differences which rise out of the essential ones, as a cause is signified through its effect; this is what is done when biped, for example, is given as the difference of man. But the proper accidents of immaterial substances are unknown to us; whence their differences cannot be signified by us either through themselves or through accidental differences.
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<td>Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem modo sumitur genus et differentia in illis substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia in sensibilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale in ipsa. Unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri sui de anima quod forma in rebus compositis ex materia et forma est differentia simplex eius, quod constituitur ex illa, non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit differentia, sed quia est principium differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua metaphysica. Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia simplex, quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem substantiae immateriales sint simplices quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo quod est pars quiditatis, sed a tota quiditate; et ideo in principio de anima dicit Avicenna quod differentiam simplicem non habent nisi species, quarum essentiae sunt compositae ex materia et forma.
<td>95. But we must notice that the genus and the difference of these substances are not taken in the same way in which the genus and the difference of sensible substances are taken. In the case of sensible substances the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, whereas the difference is taken from that which is formal in it. Whence Ibn-Sînâ says at the beginning of his book <i>On the Soul</i> that form in things composed of matter and form is the simple difference of that which is constituted by it; but not in such a way that the form is the difference, but because the form is the principle of the difference, as the same writer says in his <i>Metaphysics</i>. And this sort of difference is called a simple difference because it is taken from what is part of the quiddity of the thing, namely, from the form. But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities, their difference cannot be taken from what is part of the quiddity, but from the whole quiddity. This is why Ibn-Sînâ says, at the beginning of <i>On the Soul</i>, that only those species have a simple difference whose essences are composed of matter and form.
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<td>Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti. Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate et differunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen ignota.
<td>96. Similarly, their genus too is taken from the whole essence, but in a different way, for separated substances agree with each other in immateriality, and differ from each other in grade of perfection, according as they withdraw from potentiality and approach pure actuality. The genus is taken from that in them which follows upon their being immaterial; for example, intellectuality or something of this sort. But the difference, which is unknown to us, is taken from that in them which follows upon their grade of perfection.
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<td>Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales, quia sunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem, quae non diversificant speciem. Gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album in participando eiusdem rationis albedinem. Sed diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis speciem diversificat, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedam, quae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum philosophum in VII de animalibus. Nec iterum est necessarium, ut divisio intellectualium substantiarum sit semper per duas differentias veras, quia hoc est impossibile in omnibus rebus accidere, ut philosophus dicit in XI de animalibus.
<td>97. And it is not necessary that these differences be accidental because they are determined by greater and lesser perfection which does not diversify a species. For grades of perfection in the reception of a same form do not diversify a species, as whiter and less white in participating whiteness which is of the same nature. But a diverse grade in the forms or natures themselves which are participated does diversify a species. For example, nature proceeds by grades from plants to animals by way of certain things which are midway between animals and plants, according to the Philosopher in book seven of <i>On Animals</i>. Nor, similarly, is it necessary that intellectual substances be divided always by two true differences, because this cannot come about in the case of all things, as the Philosopher says in book eleven of <i>On Animals</i>.
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<td>Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et finitum, propter hoc quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est recepta in materia signata. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius, et in eis iam propter divisionem materiae signatae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in una specie. Et in his qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas, supra dictum est.
<td>98. Essence is found in a third way in substances composed of matter and form. Here it is both the case that existence is received and limited because they have existence from another; and that their nature or quiddity is received in designated matter. And so, they are limited both from above and from below. And because of the division of designated matter, the multiplication of individuals in one species is here possible. As regards the question how the essence of these substances is related to the logical intentions, we have explained that above.
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<td><b>Caput 5</b><br>
Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus.
<td>99. What remains now is to see how essence is in accidents; how it is in all substances has been discussed.
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<td>Qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis, dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeant essentiam quo habent diffinitionem. Diffinitionem autem habent incompletam, quia non possunt diffiniri, nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum diffinitione. Et hoc ideo est, quia non habent per se esse, absolutum a subiecto,
<td>100. And because essence, as has been said, is that which is signified by the definition, it is necessary that accidents have essence in the way in which they have definition. They have an incomplete definition because they cannot be defined unless a subject is placed in their definition. And this is so because they do not have existence in themselves free of a subject.
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<td>sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale, quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale, quando accidens subiecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma substantialis completam essentiam habet nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud, cuius est forma; et ita diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuius, quod est extra genus eius, sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis. Unde et in diffinitione animae ponitur corpus a naturali, qui considerat animam solum in quantum est forma physici corporis.
<td>101. But just as a substantial existence results from matter and form when they are composed, so from an accident and a subject results an accidental existence when the accident comes to the subject. And this is also why neither substantial form nor matter have a complete essence because it is necessary to place in the definition of substantial form that of which it is the form; and so its definition is formulated by the addition of something which is outside its genus, just like the definition of an accidental form. Whence, also, the body is placed in the definition of the soul by the natural philosopher, who considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of a physical body.
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<td>Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et accidentales tantum interest, quia sicut forma substantialis non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia. Et ideo ex coniunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse, in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se; propter quod ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam. Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat completam rationem essentiae, tamen est pars essentiae completae. Sed illud, cui advenit accidens, est ens in se completum, subsistens in suo esse. Quod quidem esse naturaliter praecedit accidens quod supervenit. Et ideo accidens superveniens ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud esse, in quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens per se, sed causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum coniunctione non resultat essentia quaedam, sicut ex coniunctione formae ad materiam. Propter quod accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars essentiae completae est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet.
<td>102. But there is this difference between substantial and accidental forms. Just as substantial form does not have existence in itself, separately from that to which it comes, neither does that to which it comes, namely, matter. And thus from the conjunction of the two results that existence in which a thing subsists in itself, and from them is produced something essentially one; and because of this an essence is the result of their conjunction. Whence, although the form considered in itself does not have the complete nature of an essence, it is nonetheless part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident comes is a being complete in itself and subsisting in its own existence. And this existence naturally precedes the accident which supervenes. And this is why the supervening accident does not, by its conjunction with that to which it comes, cause that existence in which a thing subsists, and through which the thing is a being in itself. It causes, rather, a certain second existence, without which the subsisting thing can be understood to be, just as what is first can be understood without what is second. Whence something essentially one is not produced from an accident and a subject, but something accidentally one. And this is why an essence does not result from their conjunction, as from the conjunction of form and matter. And this is why an accident neither has the nature of a complete essence, nor is it part of a complete essence. But just as it is a being in a qualified way, so too does it have essence in a qualified way.
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<td>Sed quia illud, quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet genere, est causa eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut ignis qui est in fine caliditatis est causa caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II metaphysicae dicitur, ideo substantia quae est primum in genere entis, verissime et maxime essentiam habens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium, quae secundario et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant.
<td>103. Now, whatever is said to be most fully and most truly in any genus is the cause of the things which are posterior in that genus; for example, fire, which is unsurpassed in heat, is the cause of heat in hot things, as it is said in the second book of the <i>Metaphysics</i>. This is why substance, which has first place in the genus of being, having essence most truly and most fully, must be the cause of accidents, which participate in the nature of being secondarily and in a qualified way.
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<td>Quod tamen diversimode contingit. Quia enim partes substantiae sunt materia et forma, ideo quaedam accidentia principaliter consequuntur formam et quaedam materiam. Forma autem invenitur aliqua, cuius esse non dependet ad materiam, ut anima intellectualis; materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam. Unde in accidentibus, quae consequuntur formam, est aliquid, quod non habet communicationem cum materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non est per organum corporale, sicut probat philosophus in III de anima. Aliqua vero ex consequentibus formam sunt, quae habent communicationem cum materia, sicut sentire. Sed nullum accidens consequitur materiam sine communicatione formae.
<td>104. But this happens in diverse ways. For, since the parts of substance are matter and form, certain accidents follow principally on form, certain others follow principally on matter. There are forms whose existence does not depend on matter, for example, intellectual souls; but matter does not have existence except through form. Whence some of the accidents which follow on form are such that they share nothing with matter; for example, to understand, which does not take place through a bodily organ, as the Philosopher proves in the third book of <i>On the Soul</i>. But some other of the accidents following on form are such that they do share something with matter; for example, to sense. But no accident follows on matter which shares nothing with form.
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<td>In his tamen accidentibus, quae materiam consequuntur, invenitur quaedam diversitas. Quaedam enim accidentia consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ad formam specialem, sicut masculinum et femininum in animalibus, quorum diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae. Unde remota forma animalis dicta accidentia non remanent nisi aequivoce. Quaedam vero consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ad formam generalem, et ideo remota forma speciali adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo cutis est in Aethiope ex mixtione elementorum et non ex ratione animae, et ideo post mortem in eis remanet. Et quia unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia et collocatur in genere vel specie per suam formam, ideo accidentia, quae consequuntur materiam, sunt accidentia individui, secundum quae etiam individua eiusdem speciei ad invicem differunt,
<td>105. Among those accidents which follow on matter we find a certain diversity. For some accidents follow on matter according to the ordering which it has to a special form; for example, male and female among animals, the diversity of which derives from matter, as is said in the tenth book of the <i>Metaphysics</i>. Whence these accidents do not remain on the removal of the form of animal, except equivocally. Other accidents follow on matter according to the ordering which it has to a general form. Thus, on the removal of the special form they still remain in the matter; for example, the blackness of an Ethiopian’s skin is from the mixture of the elements and not from his soul; and this is why it remains in him after death. And because each and every thing is individuated by matter and placed in a genus or species by its form, accidents which follow on matter are accidents of the individual, and it is according to these that individuals of a same species differ from one another.
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<td>accidentia vero, quae consequuntur formam, sunt propriae passiones vel generis vel speciei; unde inveniuntur in omnibus participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam, quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animae hominis.
<td>106. But accidents following on form are the proper attributes of the genus or of the species. Whence they are found in every thing which participates in the nature of the genus or of the species. For example, man’s ability to laugh follows on the form because laughter takes place by reason of the fact that a man’s soul has grasped something.
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<td>Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia aliquando ex principiis essentialibus causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut calor in igne, qui semper est actu calidus; aliquando vero secundum aptitudinem tantum, sed complementum accidit ex agente exteriori, sicut diaphaneitas in aere, quae completur per corpus lucidum exterius. Et in talibus aptitudo est accidens inseparabile, sed complementum, quod advenit ex aliquo principio, quod est extra essentiam rei vel quod non intrat constitutionem rei, est separabile, sicut moveri et huiusmodi.
<td>107. It should also be noticed that sometimes the essential principles cause accidents in a state of perfect actuality, as heat in the case of fire which is always actually hot. But sometimes they cause accidents which are only aptitudes, their completion being received from an exterior agent; for example, transparency in the air, which is completed by some exterior light-emitting body. And in such things the aptitude is an inseparable accident, but the completion, which comes from some principle which is outside the essence of the thing, or which does not enter the constitution of the thing, is separable; for example, being moved and things of this sort.
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<td>Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et species quam in substantiis.
<td>108. It should be noticed, further, that the genus, the species, and the difference of accidents are taken in a way which differs from the way in which those of substances are taken.
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<td>Quia enim in substantiis ex forma substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum una quadam natura ex earum coniunctione resultante, quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collocatur, ideo in substantiis nomina concreta, quae compositum significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel animal. Non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisi per reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur. Sed ex accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se. Unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione aliqua natura, cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. Unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica.
<td>109. In substances something essentially one results from the substantial form and matter, a certain nature results from their conjunction, a nature which is properly placed in the predicament of substance. This is why concrete names of substances which signify the composite are properly said to be in a genus, as species or genera; for example, man or animal. But the form, or the matter, is not in a predicament in this way, though each is in a predicament by reduction, as principles are said to be in a genus. Something essentially one does not, on the contrary, result from an accident and its subject. Whence the result of their conjunction is not a certain nature, to which the intention of genus or species may be attributed. Whence names of accidents expressed concretely are not placed in a predicament as species or genera; for example, white or musical, except by reduction. They are placed in a predicament only according as they are signified in the abstract; for example, whiteness and music.
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<td>Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum philosophum IX metaphysicae. Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia propriae passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur. Sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum, in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus.
<td>110. And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus cannot be taken from matter and their difference from form, as in the case of composed substances. Rather, their first genus must be taken from their way of existing itself, according to which the word “being” is diversely predicated of the ten genera according to a priority and posteriority; for example, an accident is called quantity from the fact that it is the measure of substance, and quality according as it is the disposition of substance, and so with the other accidents, according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the <i>Metaphysics</i>. But their differences are taken from the diversity of the principles by which they are caused. And because proper attributes are caused by the proper principles of the subject, the subject is placed in their definition to function as the difference if they are defined in the abstract, which is the way in which they are properly in a genus; as when it is said that snubnosedness is the turned-up-ness of the nose. But the converse would be the case if their definition were taken according as they are said concretely. For in this way the subject is placed in their definition as a genus because they are then being defined after the manner of composed substance, in which the genus is taken from matter; as when we say that a snub nose is a turned up nose.
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<td>Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit philosophus relationem in V metaphysicae.
<td>111. We have a similar case if one accident is the principle of another, as action and passion and quantity are principles of relation. And this is why the Philosopher divides relation according to these in book five of the <i>Metaphysics</i>.
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<td>Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differentiae coloris, quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae species colorum causantur.
<td>112. But because the proper principles of accidents are not always manifest, we sometimes take the difference of accidents from their effects; as when <i>concentrating</i> and <i>diffusing</i> are called the differences of color. These effects are caused by the abundance and the scarcity of light, which cause the diverse species of color.
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<td><b>Caput 6</b><br>
Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substantiis et accidentibus et quomodo in substantiis compositis et simplicibus et qualiter in his omnibus intentiones universales logicae inveniuntur excepto primo, quod est in fine simplicitatis, cui non convenit ratio generis vel speciei et per consequens nec diffinitio propter suam simplicitatem. In quo sit finis et consummatio huius sermonis. Amen.
<td>113. And so it is clear how essence is in substances and in accidents, and how it is in composed substances in simple ones, and how the universal intentions of logic are found in all of these, with the exception of the First Principle, which is infinitely simple, and to which, because of its simplicity, belongs the notion neither of the genus nor of the species, nor consequently definition. With this, let the discussion, its tasks achieve brought to a close.
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