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recGovernance.tex
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\section{Recommendation: ASAT Governance}
\label{section::governance}
Two parallels present themselves for governance structures: nuclear
weapons and environmental regulations. Space debris is, quite
rightly, viewed as a pollutant. \acp{kasat} are also strategic
weapons. Historical precedent and learned lessons from prior
successes and failures such as the Montreal Protocol, Paris Accords,
and various nuclear test ban treaties may help inform future discourse
and actions. The governance structures presented here are designed to
be exemplary in nature and to stimulate discussion.
\subsection{Recent Attempts at Governance}
\label{section::governance::prior}
\begin{itemize}
\item In April, 2021, Nivedita Raju with the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute authored a
\href{https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/eunpdc_no_74.pdf}{
proposal to ban ASAT testing}.\cite{eu-ban}
\item In November, 2021, Russia launched an A-235 Nudol interceptor
and destroyed Kosmos 1408\cite{brian}, suggesting a lack of
willingness to ban all \ac{kasat} testing to say nothing of banning
them outright.
\item In January, 2022, a Chinese satellite had a potential
conjunction event with a piece of debris from the Russian 2021
demonstration.\cite{mums-the-china} The Chinese still did not make
any official comment on Russia's use of a
\ac{dasat}.\cite{mums-the-china} ``The PRC continues to strengthen
its military space capabilities, despite its public stance against
the weaponization of space.''\cite[p66]{osd-china-21}
\item In April, 2022, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris
\href{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZANjCHvSEpM}{announced} a
commitment not to conduct further destructive \ac{dasat}
tests.\cite{kamala-pinky-swears} It should be noted that the
commitment ``...not to conduct destructive direct-ascent
antisatellite missile testing.'' is non-binding and seems like it
would not have applied to the 2008 destruction of US 193 by an SM-3
\ac{dasat}.
\item In September, 2022, the United States Mission to the UN
submitted a
\href{https://uploads.mwp.mprod.getusinfo.com/uploads/sites/25/2022/09/US-ASAT-Documents-1-1.pdf}{proposed
resolution} banning the destructive testing of \ac{dasat}
missiles.\cite{un-asat-me-not} It should be noted that the
resolution only bans \aclp{dasat}, and does not address other
\aclp{kasat} such as \aclp{coasat}.\cite{un-asat-me-not} It also
does not attempt to ban \acp{abm} interceptors.\cite{un-asat-me-not}
China, Russia, and North Korea all voted against it, while India
abstained.\cite{not-so-chinese}
\end{itemize}
None of the prior attempts at banning appear to have gained much
traction with the UN Security Council. Furthermore, even if any of
the present proposals or calls to action were to pass, none possess a
sufficiently-broad definition so as to encompass all of the
\acp{kasat} that may yet be developed.
\subsection{\acf{cnc} Safeguards}
Historically, those who have been capable of launching nuclear
missiles have shown restraint at every level. In 1983, a false
positive on RADAR theoretically should have led to the launch of
nuclear weapons, but did not, because the officer in charge
(Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov) determined that it was a false positive
and exercised restraint.\cite{petrov-knows-best} In 1962, Kennedy and
Khrushchev were able to de-escalate from the brink of nuclear war. To
this day, legal and operational safeguards are in place at every level
in the United States to ensure that nuclear weapons are not utilized
either accidentally, flippantly, or irresponsibly.
Military doctrine surrounding the use of \acp{kasat} should be
published. In the event that such doctrine is largely absent, it
should be developed. For example:
\textbf{Escalation Policy:} The circumstances under which it is
considered reasonable to launch ASAT missiles should be articulated,
and enforced.
\textbf{Chain of Command:} The set of officers and leaders with
authority to order the launch of ASAT missiles should be clearly
defined, and those officers/leaders should be well-trained in the
consequences of their actions.
\textbf{Target Selection:} While it appears as though China tested one
of their ASAT missiles for use against an American GPS satellite, such
an attack would generate debris that is likely to live for millenia
and endanger some of the most valuable capabilities that all citizens
from all nations currently enjoy. It might be reasonable, subject to
an escalation policy, to avoid targets at higher orbital altitudes.
\textbf{Attack Methodology:} If, as seems likely, multiple attack
vectors are available, the least destructive vector should be chosen.
For example, a head-on collision will generate a very different debris
profile than a strike in the nadir (facing the center of the Earth)
direction.
\textbf{De-Escalation:} Similar to nuclear de-escalation channels, a
method of communicating with command personnel at various ASAT-armed
adversaries should be created.
\textbf{No-First-Strike:} Similar to nuclear armaments, nations should
pledge to not be the first to launch a \ac{kasat}.
Several CNC safeguards can be enacted without substantively harming
the secrecy and efficacy of the ASAT systems. The United States, for
example, regularly updates and publishes nuclear doctrine and
de-escalation procedures.
\subsection{Testing Limitations}
Starting with the premise that stockpiles will not be eliminated and
testing will not end, the obvious followup question is how to
effectively limit testing. Any viable solution must meet certain
criteria:
\textbf{Verification:} It should be possible to verify any claims
regarding test results in as unambiguous a manner as possible.
\textbf{Attribution:} Any violations of the agreed limitations should
be directly attributable to the offending nation.
\textbf{Efficacy:} The restrictions should still permit reasonable
testing for \acp{kasat} development.
\textbf{Safety:} Undue risk to civil space exploration should be
avoided.
\subsubsection{Verification \& Attribution}
Any defined restriction would likely need to be derivable from
quantities that are observable not only to governments, but also to
private industry. Absent some method of verification, effective
restrictions would be impossible. Figure \ref{figure::observables}
lists several such attributes.
\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tblr}[
label = {tbl::gov::test},
]{%
colspec = {Q[c,m]|Q[c,m,wd=1in]|Q[c,m,wd=1in]|Q[c,m,wd=1in]},
row{odd} = {gray!25}, row{even} = {white},
row{1} = {gray!65},
}
{\bf Restriction}
& {\bf Known to Governments?}
& {\bf Known to the Public?}
& {\bf Verifiable by Private Industry?}
\\
Orbital Altitude of Test & \derX{} & \derX{} & \derX{} \\
Relative Velocity at Impact & \derX{} & \derX{} & \\
Angle of Impact & \derX{} & \derX{} & \\
Orbital Inclination & \derX{} & \derX{} & \derX{} \\
Latitude/Longitude of Impact & \derX{} & \derX{} & \\
Mass of the Target & \derX{} & \derX{} & \\
Mass of the Interceptor & {\bf ?} & & \\
Suborbital Trajectory & \derX{} & \derX{} & \\
Number of Pieces of Trackable Debris & \derX{} & \derX{} & \derX{} \\
Number of Pieces of Untrackable Debris & & & \\
\end{tblr}
\caption{Observable quantities which might be of use in defining
testing and use limitations of \aclp{kasat}.}
\label{figure::observables}
\end{figure}
While private industry is well-poised to observe that a \ac{kasat}
test has occurred by observing changes in trackable debris, it is
unlikely that there is sufficient commercial monitoring of unannounced
launches to be capable of attributing a launch to a specific nation.
\subsubsection{Efficacy and Safety}
A good definition of acceptable use would likely involve concepts such
as ``Odds of a subsequent collision within 10 years'' or ``impact
debris expectancy''.\cite[p19]{italiano} However, determining those
values can be quite difficult even for cooperative
parties.\cite[p18]{italiano} While it is conceivable that a
formulation of these concepts could be developed and agreed-upon, that
prospect seems unlikely. Proxy values (such as total number of pieces
of trackable debris above a certain size) might be more useful.
However, even ``simple'' quotas such as the total number of pieces of
trackable debris still present significant challenges. RADAR systems
are not universally consistent in their
capabilities\cite[T4]{cpl-oreilly}, nor are the complete capabilities
of any given nation necessarily known. Different RADAR systems are
effective at observing different sizes and distributions of debris and
as RADAR systems become more and more sophisticated, more debris will
be cataloged. If, for example, a quota of 3,000 pieces of trackable
debris were set one day when a nation has only 1,500 pieces in orbit,
then the next day a new RADAR system goes online which then finds a
new cohort of 2,000 pieces attributable that nation's \ac{kasat}
launch, does that new cohort count against the nation's quota? Even
if a numerical model is agreed upon which purports to predict the
probability of a natural collision, its output would likely still
change when better knowledge of initial conditions is made available
and the same issue exists.
Several years of data suggest that the amount of debris generated from
a Mission Shakti style event is generally ``manageable''. The naive
model present in the
\href{https://github.com/harrison-caudill/gabby}{Gabby software
package} has been shown to work reasonably well at predicting the
overall status of debris clouds.\cite{gabby} Using this model, several
scenarios were run and it was found that the overall amount of
trackable debris in orbit would be quite manageable under responsible
testing conditions. For example, as shown in figure
\ref{figure::gabby::doomsday::shakti} in appendix
\ref{appendix::gabby}, the total number of pieces of trackable debris
in orbit remains below 2,000 even if 3 Mission Shakti style events
were to happen at random times each year. Since that number of pieces
of trackable debris represents a small fraction of the total number,
an argument could be made that it is ``manageable''. However, it
should be noted that further research and consultation with existing
experts is required to guard against unseen threats, such as
untrackable debris. Current models predict the mean time between
natural collisions between existing objects in orbit to be measured in
years.\cite[p6]{kessler-reunion} Since the equilibrium amount of
debris caused by this testing regimen would not appreciably change
those circumstances, it seems reasonable, if naive, to assume that it
would not accelerate the development of Kessler Syndrome by much.
Ultimately, if each nation is on some form of impact quota (be it
number of pieces of debris, or some other universally accepted
computation, or \ldots), then it provides the incentives necessary to
develop ASAT systems which minimize that impact. They are
incentivized to seek out ways to clean up their own debris. They are
incentivized to test at low orbital altitude. They are incentivized
to behave far more responsibly. They are incentivized to develop
\acp{safe}.
\subsection{Initial Conditions and Grandfathering}
Since Russia and China are likely already beyond any sensible debris
quota, an argument could be made that those nations should be, at
least partially, grandfathered in. At the same time, however, Russia
and China have both executed ASAT tests well after knowledge of the
perils of Kessler Syndrome became widespread. It doesn't seem
unreasonable to count any tests performed after the Kessler Divide
(either after the publication of Kessler's seminal work or after
sufficient mass was launched into orbit to initiate Kessler Syndrome)
against their national quota. In some sense, they knew better at the
time, and did it anyway.
\subsection{Enforcement}
In addition to the slew of traditional enforcement mechanisms for
treaty violations, such as sanctions, NATO recently announced that
there would likely be a military response if Russia employed nuclear
weapons in Ukraine.\cite{nato-gets-physical} Since any military
response must enjoy the popular support of those who bring power to
the decision-makers, it is deeply unclear if use of \acp{kasat} would
be met with that conviction.
Remuneration for damaged spacecraft could be considered, but is
generally problematic. To request remuneration, one must first
provide evidence that the offending party was responsible. In the
case of debris from an ASAT missile launch that means that a piece of
trackable debris must then collide with an active spacecraft for there
to be economic damages. If the spacecraft is inactive, then there are
no damages to consider. On the other hand, if the spacecraft is still
functioning then it likely has the ability to maneuver and avoid the
collision in the first place. Furthermore, if the piece of debris
causing the damage is untracked, then it cannot be attributed to any
specific nation. That leaves damages from tracked pieces of debris to
spacecraft that are still functioning but unable to maneuver to avoid
the collision. This scenario is expected to be an edge case.
\subsection{Analogous Governance Systems}
The Montreal Protocol is an excellent example of international
cooperation to reduce a pollutant based upon numerical analysis and
restrictions.\cite{oh-canada} With continued international support and
consistent updates, the Montreal Protocol is on track to have reverted
damage to the Ozone Layer back to pre-industrial levels by
2060-2075.\cite{oh-canada} The Paris Accords, on the other hand, have
so far been far less effective.\cite{lousy-paris}
Nuclear governance is also a clear analog. The strategic nature of
the weapons in terrestrial warfare is closely related to that of
\acp{kasat} in the orbital domain. Nuclear armaments have not been
banned, nor are they likely to be banned. While much progress has
been made on banning nuclear testing, those tests still happen. There
is also less of a necessity as numerical simulations have largely
supplanted physical tests. It should be noted, however, that
numerical simulation proceeded hundreds of physical tests, thereby
allowing numerical models to be validated by real-world testing. No
such long history of \ac{kasat} testing exists.