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Add return_to behaviour to 404 -> login flow #4916
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Looks good - left some minor suggestions. Before the final 🦭 I'll take it for a short spin on preview app though.
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@ukutaht I'm a bit concerned that as-is this can be used to craft malicious links.
https://pr-4916.review.plausible.io/login?return_to=https:%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fhack%2Fplausible.io
If on the return URL is a copy of the Plausible login page, the user may naively enter their details again, inadvertently sharing their details with a hacker.
@apata good point. The |
Co-authored-by: Adrian Gruntkowski <adrian.gruntkowski@gmail.com>
Thanks, that's a good point! I've taken a stab at it here. A few points about this commit:
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Ad 5. this was originally a workaround for issue with internal redirects failing when there's a url encoded UTF8 character in the path (the domain of the site, in particular): #3560 - phoenix was validating the "to" URLs a bit overzealously. The phoenix version we currently are on (1.7.14) has this behavior changed via phoenixframework/phoenix@4ca6ca2. This should no longer be an issue and we should be able to get back to using internal "to" redirects. |
I'm happy with that, @ukutaht! But because this feature allows redirecting to a page that has itself url search params (https://pr-4916.review.plausible.io/login?return_to=/sites%3Ffoo%3Dbar), any other open redirect vulnerability that we might have would still be exploitable. Before we release it, we should double check that we don't have any. Edit: From my side, I couldn't find any other redirects that take user input. |
Changes
It's quite annoying at the moment to:
This PR implements a
return_to
query param used in login flow, including when 2fa challenge is presented. This way the user lands on the intended page.We currently have a session-based
login_dest
variable but it only works for known routes which dashboards are not. It could have been extended for this use-case but I felt like using query params is better when session state isn't strictly necessary.